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Beating Blackwater: Using Domestic Legislation to
Enforce the International Code of Conduct for Private
Military Companies
In the past decade, state use of private military companies (PMCs) has
greatly expanded, sparked in large part by U.S. reliance on contractors in the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But several of the most horrific human rights
abuses of the wars exposed the absence of a regulatory regime governing the
conduct of PMCs, prompting an international movement to establish some
kind of legal framework to promote accountability. After years of diplomatic
negotiations, this resulted in 2010 in the creation of the International Code of
Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC), which delineates the
obligations of private companies.' The ICoC Association (ICoCA) was
subsequently launched in September 2013 to certify that companies are meeting
the Code's standards.
But while the development of a monitoring body is encouraging, ICoCA
suffers from a critical shortcoming: it lacks any kind of serious enforcement
mechanism. Because most commentary has focused on the Code's importance
in codifying a new area of international law,' few have recognized that ICoCA's
actual effectiveness hinges on the willingness of states to enact corresponding
domestic legislation that can provide a system of enforcement. This Comment
1. About the ICoC, INT'L CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS,
http://www.icoc-psp.org/About ICoC.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).
2. See Whitney Grespin, An Act of Faith: Building the International Code of Conduct for Private
Security Providers, DIPLOMATIC COURIER (July 19, 2012), http://www.diplomaticourier.com
/news/topics/security/1233-an-act-of-faith-building-the-international-code-of-conduct-for
-private-security-providers; ICoCA Launch Marks Significant Step to Improve Private Security
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highlights this issue and argues that discrete domestic legal reforms modeled
on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR) would enable the United States to galvanize compliance
with the ICoC and ensure that the Association is able to serve its function.
Part I surveys the growth of private military companies and recent
international efforts to regulate the industry. Part II argues that the ICoC
suffers from the absence of a viable method of enforcement, and ICoCA, as it
currently stands, provides an insufficient oversight mechanism. It shows how
the alternative methods of enforcement that have been proposed thus far are
either infeasible or of limited efficacy. Part III explores how the United States
could bolster ICoCA through domestic legislation that draws from the
approaches of the FCPA and ITAR. It also discusses how this could, in the long
run, trigger changes in behavior on a global level.
I. THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO REGULATION
After years of being maligned as mercenaries, private military contractors
reemerged following the end of the Cold War. Weak states with few military
capabilities turned to PMCs for help,' and even the United States hired private
firms to supplement its military operations in the 1990s in order to lower
costs.4 This trend accelerated dramatically following the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan in 2001. Over the course of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the
involvement of PMCs ballooned. Their role expanded from support activity to
essential military functions, including combat,5 and by the later years of the
wars, half of total U.S. personnel deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan were
3. One of the most high profile examples of this was Sierra Leone's use of Executive Outcomes
in 1995 to help defeat rebel guerrilla groups. See Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The
Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
1001, 1119 (2004). Private companies were involved in many other conflicts in Africa in the
1990s, including in Zaire, Congo, and Equatorial Guinea. Id. at 1118-19.
4. The value of U.S. Department of Defense contracts with PMCs between 1994 and 2002 was
estimated at over $300 billion. Adam Ebrahim, Going to War with the Army You Can Afford:
The United States, International Law, and the Private Military Industry, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 181,
185 (2010); see P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms
and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521, 522 (2004). Private firms were also
used in situations in which U.S. forces could not directly intervene. For instance, the State
Department relied on MPRI, a PMC, to train the Croatian army in the mid-1990s. P.W.
SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 119-25
(2003).
s. See Michaels, supra note 3, at 1031-33 (discussing the use of private contractors to provide
security for high-level Iraqi and American officials and to conduct offensive raids).
2560
123: 255 9 2014
BEATING BLACKWATER
private contractors.' However, this extensive involvement by private forces
gave rise to some of the most heinous human rights abuses of the wars,
including the 2007 Nisour Square shooting7 and the Abu Ghraib prison
scandal.' Upon coming to light, these incidents provoked domestic and
international outrage and highlighted the legally ambiguous space in which
contractors operated.
In response, the United States enacted several reforms to ensure that
contractors were held accountable for their actions. 9 The Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), originally passed in 2000, was
expanded in 2004 to allow contractors supporting Defense Department
missions abroad to be prosecuted for crimes that would result in more than one
year of imprisonment if they were committed within the United States.'o And
in 2007, Congress amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to
subject private contractors to the system of courts-martial should they engage
in misconduct.n Few individuals have been prosecuted under the new
6. Chandler Harris, As Wars Draw Down, Overseas Contracting Builds Up,
CLEARANCEJOBS.COM: DEFENSE NEWS & CAREER ADVICE (Oct. 30, 2012), http://news
.clearancejobs.con/2o12/io/3o/as-wars-draw-down-overseas-contracting-builds-up ("DOD
data reveals that from FY2008 to FY2011, contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan represented 52
percent of the total force . . . ."). The Pentagon relied so heavily on PMCs in Iraq that even
at the height of the surge, the number of private contractors in Iraq exceeded the number of
combat troops. T. Christian Miller, Contractors Outnumber Troops in Iraq, L.A. TIMEs, July 4,
2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2oo7/jul/o4/nation/na-private4.
7. Charles Tiefer, No More Nisour Squares: Legal Control of Private Security Contractors in Iraq
and After, 88 OR. L. REV. 745, 754 (2009) (describing how Blackwater guards fired into a
crowd in Baghdad's Nisour Square and killed seventeen unarmed civilians).
8. An Army investigation concluded that six employees of Titan and CACI, two prominent
PMCs, either participated in the abuse or failed to report it. The Army generals who
conducted the investigation recommended that the Justice Department prosecute the six
individuals. See Joel Brinkley & James Glanz, The Struggle for Iraq: Civilian Employees;
Contract Workers Implicated in February Army Report on Prison Abuse Remain on the job, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 2004, http://www.nytimes.con/2004/o5/o4/world/struggle-for-iraq-civilian
-employees-contract-workers-implicated-february-army.html; Renae Merle & Ellen
McCarthy, 6 Employees from CACI International, Titan Referred for Prosecution, WASH. POST,
Aug. 26, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33834-2oo4Aug25.html.
In addition to these incidents, there have been many other allegations of abuse. See John
Hendren & Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Charges Contractor over Beating of Afghan Detainee, L.A.
TIMES, June 18, 2004, http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jurV8/world/fg-cial8.
9. See Tiefer, supra note 7, at 755-56.
1o. JENNIFER ELSEA, MOSHE SCHWARTZ & KENNON H. NAKAMURA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL32419, PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQc BACKGROUND, LEGAL STATUS AND
OTHER ISSUES 23-25 (2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf.
ii. Id. at 25-26.
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provisions, but the reforms went some way toward bringing U.S. military
contractors under U.S. law."
The issue, however, has grown well beyond the activities of contractors
employed by the United States. The U.S. wars have changed the landscape
elsewhere by giving rise to massive multinational PMCs and also legitimating
their use. This global industry is now estimated to have gross revenue of over
$100 billion per year,13 and these companies are not closing shop just because
the U.S. wars are ending. Instead, these sophisticated enterprises have shifted
their focus to other lucrative regions.14
For this reason, the absence of a clear legal framework to govern the
conduct of multinational PMCs is highly problematic. 5 Domestic legal
reforms, such as those enacted by the United States, have helped to hold
private contractors participating in U.S. military operations accountable, but
they do little to regulate the global PMC industry for two reasons. First, MEJA
and the UCMJ can only be used to prosecute individuals. When companies
providing military services act illegally, no clear statutory basis exists to hold
12. Only twelve people, few of whom were military contractors, have been charged under MEJA
since its inception. Id. at 2S; see also Peter Singer, Frequently Asked Questions on the UCMJ
Change and Its Applicability to Private Military Contractors, BROOKINGS (Jan. 12, 2007),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2007/ol/12defenseindustry-singer ("MEJA
. . . has proven to be pretty much mythical in application to the contractor world .... ).
13. Arjun Sethi, Military Contracting: Our New Era of Corporate Mercenaries, GUARDIAN,
Jan. 23, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2o13/jan/23/military-contracting
-corporate-mercenaries.
14. For instance, in 2011, Reflex Responses, a new company created by Erik Prince, the founder
of Blackwater, signed a $529 million deal with the United Arab Emirates to create a
specialized foreign battalion for the UAE. Mark Mazzetti & Emily B. Hager, Secret Desert
Force Set up by Blackwater's Founder, N.Y. TiMEs, May 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com
/2011/oS/iS/world/middleeast/l5prince.html. PMCs constitute some of the largest private
employers and have a growing presence in Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.
G4S alone operates in over 125 different countries. See Luke McKenna & Robert Johnson, A
Look at the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Armies, Bus. INSIDER (Feb. 26, 2012, 8:37 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/bi-mercenary-armies-2012-2.
1s. While many contractors have served honorably, the secrecy with which they operate and the
absence of formal training make PMCs acting without oversight more likely to commit
transgressions. Allegations of misconduct by private contractors have been abundant during
both the U.S. wars and other missions. For instance, in 2oo6, employees of a South African
PMC were accused of plotting a coup in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Craig
Timberg, Congo Holding 3 Americans in Alleged Coup Plot, WASH. POST, May 25, 20o6,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2oo6/o5/24/AR2oo6o524ol591.html;
see also Michaels, supra note 3, at 1o89 (explaining why "[c]ivilian contractors ... cannot
necessarily be expected . .. to exercise the . . . authority, judgment, or lethal force entrusted
to soldiers" (footnote omitted)).
2562
123: 255 9 2014
BEATING BLACKWATER
the whole company liable.'" Additionally, these laws fail to address the
industry's increasingly global presence. The United States is no longer the
only, or even the primary, consumer for private security providers.
Consequently, laws that impose liability only for misdeeds occurring alongside
Department of Defense missions do not adequately constrain the conduct of
PMCs abroad.
Accordingly, since the mid-2000s, the international community has sought
to fill the void by constructing a global regime that can better monitor these
companies, ensure compliance with human rights norms and international
humanitarian law, and hold violators accountable. The first such effort was led
by the Swiss government and the International Committee of the Red Cross,
which resulted in the completion of the Montreux Document in 20o8.'7 The
document provides a list of best practices that states should implement to
manage PMCs." Forty-nine countries have become signatories to date. 9 Yet
Montreux's efficacy has been limited both because it does not create any
binding commitments and because it is directed at PMC behavior in armed
conflicts, which constitutes only a fraction of PMC activities.2 o
Montreux was followed by a more ambitious multi-stakeholder initiative,
which led to the creation of the International Code of Conduct for Private
Security Service Providers. The ICoC outlines the obligations of private
security companies under international law and specifies rules that ought to
govern the use of force and vetting procedures for subcontractors." Unlike
earlier initiatives, the ICoC has been signed by over 708 companies worldwide
and has garnered significant support from states and nongovernmental
organizations. The creation of the Code is a promising step in the effort to
ensure that private military companies respect human rights and comply with
international law. Nonetheless, its current effectiveness is limited because it
lacks a viable enforcement mechanism.
16. See ELSEA ET AL., supra note lo, at 23-27.
17. The Montreux Document, INT'L COMMITrEE RED CROSS (Aug. 2oo9), http://www.icrc.org
/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-oo2 o 9 9 6.pdf.
18. Id.
ig. Participating States of the Montreux Document, Swiss FED. DEP'T FOREIGN AFF. (last updated
Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/parsta.html.
20. See Amol Mehra, Bridging Accountability Gaps- The Proliferation of Private Military and
Security Companies and Ensuring Accountability for Human Rights Violations, 22 PAC.
McGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 323, 328 (2olo).
21. About the ICoC, supra note 1; see also Daniel Warner, Establishing Norms for Private Military
and Security Companies, 40 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y io6, 116 (2012).
22. See sources cited supra note 2.
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II. THE INADEOUACY OF ICOCA
If the ICoC is to fulfill its goal of constructing a global governance system
to regulate private military companies, it must be meaningfully enforced. The
ICoC Association was launched in September 2013 in order to provide an
oversight mechanism for the Code. States and human rights organizations
lauded the formation of ICoCA as a groundbreaking step in regulating the
industry. The State Department even announced that it "anticipates
incorporating membership in the ICoC Association as a requirement in the
bidding process" for all future diplomatic security contracts. 3 Membership is
open to all companies, civil society groups, and states that agree to adhere to
the Code.
The Association is led by a Board of Directors empowered to monitor and
certify the compliance of signatory companies. 4 The Board is chosen by the
vote of all members and consists of twelve individuals, with four members
coming from PMCs, four from civil society organizations, and four from
states.25 ICoCA's charter calls for in-field assessments of company practices and
consultation between the Board and companies whose practices are found to
violate the Code. 6 It also establishes a complaint procedure through which
allegations of misconduct can be reported.2 7 While these are surely positive
developments, it is difficult to see how they will be able to engender
compliance with the Code's strict requirements without any punitive
mechanisms. The absence of a judicial body or forum where PMCs can be held
accountable if they persist in violating norms makes adherence to the Code
largely voluntary.
Various options have been proposed as alternative mechanisms to enforce
the ICoC. The first of these is the adoption of a binding multilateral treaty that
would require signatories to provide for domestic enforcement of the ICoC
23. State Department to Incorporate International Code of Conduct into Worldwide Protective
Services Contracts, U.S. DEP'T STATE (Aug. 16, 2013) [hereinafter State Department],
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2o13/o8/213212.htm.
24. Articles of Association, INT'L CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS
Ass'N 2-3, http://www.icoca.ch/assets/icoc-aoa-english2.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2014).
25. Id. A General Assembly and a Secretariat body assist the Board in carrying out its
certification and monitoring duties. Election to the Board is determined by the Assembly, in
which each member of ICoCA receives one vote. See id. at 2, 6.
26. Id. at 7-8; see also Elizabeth Holland, New Charter Outlines Concrete Steps to Implement the
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Contractors, JDSUPRA (Apr. ii, 2013),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-charter-outlines-concrete-steps-to-i-79233.




provisions.2s While such a treaty would likely be the most rigorous method of
bolstering the ICoC, it is not a viable option for the near future. The
international consensus that is required to achieve such a comprehensive treaty
simply does not exist at this point, as demonstrated by the limitations of the
Montreux effort.
Another option that has been floated is to leverage profits from government
contracting to induce compliance with the Code's provisions. Because the
United States, United Kingdom, and United Nations have all made
government contract awards contingent on company membership in ICoCA,
some argue that the potential loss of business opportunities will deter
companies from disregarding the Code's obligations. 29 While this is a
significant incentive, it is insufficient for two reasons. Firstly, because of the
shrinking defense budgets in the United States and Western Europe,3o the
ability of the United States and its allies to sway the behavior of PMCs is
limited. Many of the most lucrative business opportunities are likely to be
found elsewhere,3' making the costs of losing U.S. and U.K. agency contracts
28. See Huma T. Yasin, Playing Catch-Up: Proposing the Creation of Status-Based Regulations to
Bring Private Military Contractor Firms Within the Purview of International and Domestic Law,
25 EMoRY INT'L L. REV. 411, 485 (2011).
29. See Nils Rosemann, International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers: A Multi-
Stakeholder Initiative of the 21st Century?, INST. FOR HUM. RTs. & Bus. (Nov. 24,
2010), http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/guest/international-codeof conductforprivate
security-providers.html; State Department, supra note 23; see also Carey L. Biron, Watchdog
Body Will Oversee Private Military Contractors, INTER PRESS SERVICE (Sept. 19, 2013),
http://www.ipsnews.net/2oi3/og/watchdog-body-will-oversee-private-military-contractors
(noting the "broad buy-in" of corporations and describing how many human rights groups
anticipate that "the potential negative impact on contracts . . . will constitute significant
motivation" for companies to comply with the ICoC).
30. See Steven Erlanger, Shrinking Europe Military Spending Stirs Concern, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/world/europe/europes-shrinking
-military-spending-under-scrutiny.html; Squeezing the Pentagon, EcONOMIST, July 6,
2013, http://www.economist.comr/news/united-states/21580460-wrong-way-cut-americas
-military-budget-squeezing-pentagon; Jon Swaine, Britain's Defence Cuts Are of 'Critical
Concern' to Special Relationship, TELEGRAPH, July 31, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co
.uk/news/uknews/defence/10212763/Britains-defence-cuts-are-of-critical-concern-to-special
-relationship.html.
31. Countries with rapidly increasing military spending include China, Saudi Arabia,
and Russia. See China Defends Growing Military Spending, AL-JAZEERA (Mar. 4, 2013,
9:37 AM), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2o13/03/2ol33472624414944.html;
Andrzej Wilk, The Russian Army-The Priority for Putin's Third Term, ISN ETH
ZURICH (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/DetaiV?lng=en&id
=167923; Dillon Zhou, 7 Countries Beefing Up Their Militaries in Today's More Dangerous
World, POLICYMIC (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.policymic.com/articles/27054/7-countries
-beefing-up-their-militaries-in-today-s-more-dangerous-world.
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minimal compared to opportunities available in other regions. Given that many
of the countries increasing military spending have checkered histories with
respect to human rights,32 this is particularly worrisome. It is unlikely that
these states will follow the United States's lead in requiring ICoCA
membership for government contracts, especially if it results in higher prices.
Consequently, many companies will simply opt to forgo the constraints of the
ICoC. While the United States should continue to use its market power to
leverage as much compliance as possible, this approach is therefore at best only
a limited means of enforcement.
Secondly, relying solely on the market could allow PMCs to essentially self-
regulate while using ICoCA to legitimize their activities, akin to what has
previously occurred. Over the past decade, private military companies formed
several industry associations to deflect criticism and improve standards.33
These associations put forth codes of conduct and were supposed to accredit
member firms based on adherence to the codes. But in practice, their ability to
regulate PMC behavior generally fell short of expectations. They maintained
close ties to the executives running the companies,34 whose desire to increase
profits for their companies conflicted with their ability to serve as effective
market monitors.3 5 In the absence of any independent punitive power, many
associations were essentially used to legitimize the industry and allow
governments to bypass more rigorous checks, while leaving companies free
to police themselves."6
32. For a sample of recent articles on human rights violations in these countries, see Ariel
Cohen, Putin's New 'Fortress Russia,' N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com
/2o12/lo/19/opinior/putins-new-fortress-russia.html; Christine Hauser, Saudi Human
Rights Record Comes Under New Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES: LEDE (Mar. 14, 2013, 7:22 PM),
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.conV2ol3/o3/14/saudi-human-rights-record-comes-under-new
-scrutiny; and Holly Yan, Report: A Decade After Hussein, Iraq Still Grapples with Human
Rights Abuses, CNN (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.cnn.conm/2o13/o3/ii/world/meast/iraq
-human-rights/index.html.
33. The most prominent of these were the Association of the Stability Operations Industry
(formerly IPOA), the British Association of Private Security Companies, and the Private
Security Company Association of Iraq. See Surabhi Ranganathan, Between Complicity and
Irrelevance? Industry Associations and the Challenge ofRegulating Private Security Contractors, 41
GEO.J. INT'LL. 303, 310-17 (2010).
34. Id. at 334-37, 357-59 (explaining how their organizational structures "create[d] greater
potential for 'capture' of institutional processes by particular members").
3s. See Stephanie M. Hurst, Note, "Trade in Force": The Need for Effective Regulation of Private
Military and Security Companies, 84 S. CAL. L. REv. 447, 463 (2011) ("Because PMSCs are not
bound to follow the Code or even to join ISOA, they can strategically choose not to join to
avoid publication and investigation of their alleged abuses and the potential corresponding
reputational damages.").




ICoCA is better placed than these industry groups were to serve as an
effective overseer, but without a stronger method of holding companies
accountable for non-compliance, it risks a similar fate. Companies embraced
the ICoC largely because their representatives were intimately involved in the
drafting and discussion process.37 While the inclusion of these parties has been
key to ICoCA's success thus far, the dominance of PMCs in the Association
risks sacrificing its independence. The overwhelming majority of the
Association's members are companies. Because all members vote to elect the
Board of Directors responsible for overseeing the companies," the industry can
exert significant influence over decisions regarding certification. With no
potential for legal accountability, ICoCA could turn into another iteration of
earlier industry associations.
The prospect of regulatory capture makes relying on the market insufficient
to truly enforce the Code. For governments that have little interest in seriously
regulating PMCs, which includes many of the countries increasing military
spending discussed earlier, mandating ICoCA certification could allow them to
claim compliance with international standards while forgoing meaningful
checks on company behavior. And even for governments that have shown a
genuine desire to prevent PMC misconduct, such as the United States and the
United Kingdom, regulatory capture makes using market mechanisms illusory.
If ICoCA membership is no longer a clear proxy for full adherence to the
Code's rigorous provisions, governments will still be forced to conduct
individualized assessments before making contracting decisions. These kinds
of case-by-case comparisons can suffer from inconsistency and inattention, and
obviate the advantages of an institution such as ICoCA. Thus, relying on the
market, while appealing, is inadequate to enforce the ICoC.
membership in an alternative association meant that its market position did not suffer
despite being refused membership by IPOA several times).
37. See Andr6 du Plessis, The Global Code of Conduct for Private Security Companies: Why
It Matters to Humanitarian Organisations, HUMANITARIAN PRAC. NETWORK (June
2010), http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-47/the-global-code
-of-conduct-for-private-security-companies-why-it-matters-to-humanitarian-organisations
(detailing how "the private security industry . . . has worked closely with the Swiss
government in the early stages of elaboration of the Code"); ICoC Temporary Steering
Committee (TSc), INT'L CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS,
http://www.icoc-psp.org/ICoC SteeringCommittee.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2014)
(describing the composition of the Steering Committee that helped produce the Association,
which includes several prominent members of the industry).
38. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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III. DOMESTIC ENFORCEMENT TO SPUR COMPLIANCE WITH THE
ICOC
This Comment therefore proposes a third approach, which aims to be more
rigorous than market mechanisms of limited efficacy but more feasible than
concluding a multilateral treaty. By strengthening the domestic legal
framework governing the conduct of private military companies, the United
States can assist international enforcement efforts and bolster the credibility of
ICoCA. More specifically, legislation modeled after the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
can be used, respectively, to directly regulate U.S.-based PMCs hired by
foreign governments and to indirectly regulate many foreign PMCs. While
some foreign companies would still be able to avoid U.S. laws, establishing
such a framework would both force many of the industry's biggest companies
to comply with the international norms and human rights standards outlined
by the ICoC and lay the groundwork for the development of a more effective
global regime.39
In the coming years, many PMCs based in the United States are likely to be
hired by foreign governments. 40 In order to hold them accountable for their
actions on behalf of these governments, U.S. laws mandating adherence to
ICoC standards4' must clearly apply to their conduct abroad. The FCPA
demonstrates how this can be accomplished through an effective
extraterritoriality provision-one that reaches all U.S. citizens, nationals, and
residents, all U.S. companies, and all foreign companies that trade securities in
the United States, regardless of the location of the illegal act.42 The FCPA
39. For a more extensive discussion of why doing so would advance U.S. foreign policy goals,
see Michaels, supra note 3, at 1111-20, which describes how U.S. reliance on contractors
"who are not comporting themselves well" threatens the success of certain missions and
hurts our reputation in the eyes of both our allies and adversaries.
40. See supra notes 13-15, 30-32 and accompanying text.
41. The United States could alternatively create its own standards if it disagreed with certain
provisions of the ICoC; as long as these are broadly similar to the ICoC's, this would still be
a useful enforcement mechanism. The exact substance of domestic laws is therefore not the
subject of this Comment; the rest of this Comment will assume for simplicity's sake that any
U.S. legislation would mandate adherence to ICoC standards.
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 8dd-i to -3 (2012); see Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, O'MELvENY & MYERS
8, 14 (2oo9), http://www.omm.com/files/upload/OMelvenyMyers SixthEditionFCPA
Handbook.pdf. Foreign nationals can also be prosecuted if any part of their prohibited
conduct occurs in the United States. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra, at io ("[P]hysical
presence in the United States is not required to create jurisdiction. ... [I]f U.S. mails and




criminalizes bribery of foreign officials and requires companies to keep detailed
records of their transactions.43 It is rigorously enforced by the Department of
Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission; violations of the law can
trigger penalties of up to $5 million and twenty years' imprisonment for
individuals and $25 million for corporations." In recent years, the DOJ and
SEC have also forced companies to disgorge profits earned through illegal
transactions. This has resulted in record-setting penalties, including fines
directed at Siemens for $800 million and Halliburton for $579 million.41 The
DOJ and SEC have been able to impose these penalties because both U.S.
companies and foreign companies that trade securities in the United States
have assets in the United States that can be readily fined.
A similar approach could be used to hold U.S.-based PMCs liable for
misconduct abroad. Authority could be given to the DOJ to pursue civil and
criminal actions against companies that depart from ICoC standards and
commit an offense. Litigation would be conducted under the purview of Article
III judges, who would be responsible for determining whether a transgression
had occurred. By making any legislation clearly applicable to both foreign and
domestic activities of U.S. companies, lawmakers could counter the
presumption against extraterritoriality.46 Because many of these companies
have assets in the United States, coupling this extraterritorial scope with
significant penalties for violations, as the FCPA did, would enable robust
enforcement. This would ensure that companies that violate the Code are not
only rebuked by ICoCA, but also held legally accountable. U.S. companies
contracting with foreign governments would thereby be compelled to adhere to
ICoC standards.
43. 15 U.S.C. 5§ 78dd-1 to -3; see also Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. DEP'T JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa (last visited Feb. 13, 2014).
44. See 15 U.S.C. S 78ff(a).
45. See Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act -1977 to 2010, 12
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 89, 1o6-o8 (2010) (listing prominent recent investigations); Amy
Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 493-94 (2011) (noting recent record-setting
penalties).
46. See 15 U.S.C. §5 78dd-l(g), 78dd-2(i) for the specific statutory language used to establish
this kind of nationality-based jurisdiction in the FCPA. An explicit provision for jurisdiction
over company conduct in foreign territory is especially important in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Kiobel. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669
(2013) (holding that "even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United
States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application," which "mere corporate presence" fails to do).
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Regulating foreign PMCs with no financial presence in the United States
poses greater difficulty.47 The FCPA model is not useful where entirely foreign
PMCs contract with foreign governments. Because these companies are
unlikely to hold assets in the United States, enforcing penalties for misconduct
becomes challenging.4' Given this, a more effective approach is to indirectly
regulate foreign PMCs, by using their reliance on the expertise of former U.S.
military officers to induce them to abide by U.S. laws. ITAR offers a helpful
framework for how to do so. The regulations implement the Arms Export
Control Act 49 and govern the import and export of defense-related products
and services, including sensitive technology and munitions; violating the
regulations can trigger hefty fines and imprisonment.5 One of ITAR's key
provisions prohibits Americans from training foreign militaries without State
Department approval. Most PMC services, including non-combat and advisory
functions, qualify as training foreign military forces and require State
Department authorization.s Yet this restriction on the activities of U.S. citizens
is rarely enforced, because the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, which is
responsible for monitoring, is understaffed and overwhelmed with managing
arms exports.52
The United States could shape the overseas conduct of some foreign PMCs
by making State Department approval of U.S. citizens' participation in PMC
47. This is especially the case for companies that have specifically restructured themselves as
foreign companies to evade U.S. laws, such as Reflex Responses, which Erik Prince created
as a UAE company after Blackwater and its successors became mired in legal troubles in the
United States. See Mazzetti & Hager, supra note 14. Another example is Sandline
International, which registered as a Bahamas corporation despite being based in the United
Kingdom to avoid stricter British regulations. See Hurst, supra note 35, at 469.
48. Unlike the foreign companies that the FCPA typically levies fines on, foreign private security
providers are unlikely to be listed on U.S. securities exchanges. See Charles J. Dunar III,
Jared L. Mitchell & Donald L. Robbins III, Private Military Industry Analysis: Private and
Public Companies, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCH. 3, 11 (Dec. 2007) (noting that "an
overwhelming majority of firms are privately held and offered no financial information" and
concluding that private firms constitute 91% of total firms).
49. 22 U.S.C. § 2751-2799aa (2012).
50. See International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §5 120.1, 120.9 (2013).
51. Id. §§ 120.1, 120.2.
52. See Congressman Brad Sherman, Keynote Address at the Thirteenth Annual Satellite Industry
Association Leadership Dinner, SATELLITE INDUS. ASS'N 3 (Mar. 15, 2010), https://www.sia.org
/wp-content/uploads/2olo/RepSherman'sAddresso3_lS201o.pdf (referring to the DDTC as
"underfunded, understaffed, and outmoded," with "a backlog encompassing a fifth of all
licenses for the year"); see also John C. Rood, Improvements to the Defense Trade Export





activity contingent on company compliance with ICoC standards. This could
essentially be accomplished through agency action if greater resources were
devoted to enforcement. U.S. persons seeking to provide defense services
abroad already must obtain a State Department license to do so. 5 The
Department could establish a policy of only granting licenses to U.S. citizens
who are working for PMCs that adhere to the ICoC and are accredited by
ICoCA. To ease the administrative burden of this approval system, the State
Department could maintain a list of compliant companies, which citizens could
then rely upon in making employment decisions. Coupling this licensing
system with the possibility of civil and criminal prosecution if individuals are
caught evading restrictions could effectively prevent Americans from offering
their military know-how to foreign companies that fail to meet international
standards.s4
Of course, this approach would not force foreign PMCs contracting with
foreign governments to obey U.S. laws or hold them liable for failure to do so.
Nonetheless, many foreign companies are heavily reliant on the unparalleled
expertise of American former military officers.5 In fact, for most companies,
their employment of highly trained former U.S. officers is their most
compelling sales pitch for obtaining business. 6 Consequently, while it is
possible that some PMCs would choose to circumvent any restrictions by
limiting their reliance on American personnel, this is unlikely to be the case
across the industry. Many of the companies would likely opt to comply with
ICoC standards in order to be able to continue hiring critical U.S. personnel.
Passing legislation modeled after the FCPA and ITAR would likely lead to
changed practices in other countries as well. The FCPA helped bring about a
dramatic change in attitudes toward corruption. Bribery has gone from being
accepted as the cost of doing business in certain countries to being treated
almost universally as unethical, illegitimate, and counterproductive for
53. See Department of State Questions, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, at 1,
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/qstate_3.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2014).
s4. Such a scheme would be similar to how ITAR violations are punished. See 22 C.F.R. S 127.3
("Any person who willfully [v]iolates [these regulations] shall upon conviction be subject to
a fine or imprisonment, or both . . . .").
ss. This includes some of the most prominent international PMCs. At MPRI, "ninety-five
percent of its employee pool formerly served in the U.S. Army." Yasin, supra note 28, at 458.
Even Reflex Responses, which primarily recruits soldiers from Latin America and Africa,
relies on former U.S. military officers to provide critical operational and training expertise
for the company. See Mazzetti & Hager, supra note 14.
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economic growth. 7 This evolution in norms resulted in the passage of the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 1999, which has since been ratified by forty
countries.ss The Convention requires signatories to enact domestic legislation
criminalizing bribery of foreign officials and monitors each country's
subsequent execution. Furthermore, the FCPA has prompted U.S. companies
to pressure other countries to pass analogous legislation so as to level the
playing field for their own businesses.59 Together, these two developments
have prompted widespread reforms abroad.o
While there are important differences between building a global anti-
corruption regime and a PMC regulatory regime, the progress the FCPA has
made illustrates how rigorous U.S. enforcement of ICoC standards could
eventually galvanize greater enforcement abroad. By engendering greater
compliance with the Code's provisions, domestic legislation could solidify
norms of behavior among PMCs. And by penalizing U.S.-based PMCs for
violations, it could create a profit incentive for these companies to urge other
countries to pass similar reforms. In conjunction, these changes could help
bring about more effective global regulation of PMCs.
Although ITAR has had a more limited impact on the development of
international norms because the regulations only apply to U.S. exporters, they
have changed the behavior of many defense-related companies in a way that
has had ripple effects throughout the industry. Because the regulations impose
a duty on companies to come forward and disclose breaches of ITAR to the
government,6 ' and impose significant penalties for failing to do so, many
munitions manufacturers have implemented internal checks to more rigorously
monitor compliance.6' Greater scrutiny of the activities of companies that train
57. See Elizabeth K. Spahn, Implementing Global Anti-Bribery Norms: From the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to the U.N. Convention Against Corruption,
23 IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (2013).
5. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, ORG. FOR EcoN. COOPERATION & DEv., http://www.oecd.org/corruption
/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
59. See Spahn, supra note 57, at 4-6.
6o. See Elizabeth K. Spahn, Multifurisdictional Bribery Law Enforcement: The OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, 53 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 23-31 (2012). The passage of the U.K. Bribery Act in 2010 is a
notable example; it is the strictest such measure in the world. Spahn, supra note 57, at 21.
61. 22 C.F.R. § 127.12 (2013).
62. For instance, Lockheed Martin now regularly appoints special officers to monitor
internal compliance with regulations. See Lockheed Martin Corp. (Dep't of State July 24,





foreign militaries would likely spur similar norms of internal corporate policing
among PMCs as well.
By using the FCPA and ITAR as models, the United States could provide
for the first truly meaningful enforcement of the ICoC, and thereby hold PMCs
accountable for a much wider range of activities than those covered by MEJA
and the UCMJ. While current congressional gridlock makes passing this kind
of legislation difficult, there are reasons to be optimistic that this proposal can
nonetheless be implemented in large part. The FCPA was similarly ambitious
and encountered significant opposition, but still managed to pass.' And the
alterations to ITAR could be enacted through executive orders instead of
legislation, thereby circumventing the need for congressional involvement. In
conjunction, these changes could in the long term trigger substantial changes
in behavior globally.
CONCLUSION
The establishment of ICoCA is an important development in building a
legal framework to govern the global conduct of PMCs. Yet it suffers from the
same weakness that has hampered earlier efforts to regulate PMCs on a
multinational scale: the absence of a viable enforcement mechanism. Through
stronger domestic legislation that borrows from the approaches of the FCPA
and ITAR, the United States could ensure greater compliance with the Code
and bolster the credibility of ICoCA as it seeks to establish a global governance
regime for PMCs.
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63. There were serious disagreements between the executive branch and factions of Congress as
to the scope of the problem and the appropriate solution. Moreover, a vocal business lobby
was vehemently opposed to the bill, arguing that it would place U.S. businesses at a
competitive disadvantage. An unlikely political coalition was nevertheless able to secure its
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